This is the first since a US drone strike on Iraqi soil killed a top Iranian general, straining Washington-Baghdad ties.

Iraq’s President Barham Saleh met with Trump on the sidelines of the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland amid threats from Iran-backed militia groups promising to exact revenge should he sit down with the American president.

It was the first high-level meeting since the January 3 US drone strike that killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimani and senior Iraqi militia commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis near Baghdad’s airport. The attack provoked the ire of Iraqi officials across the political spectrum and lead to the passing of a non-binding resolution to oust US troops from Iraq.

In response, Trump threatened sanctions in Iraq, which would have profound and devastating effects on the country’s economy if realized.

Trump said Washington and Baghdad have had “a very good relationship” and that the two countries had a “host of very difficult things to discuss,” in remarks to reporters.

Asked whether the administration was still considering slapping sanctions on Iraq, Trump said: “We’ll see what happens because we have to do things on our terms.”

Saleh interjected here, saying the two countries shared common interests including the fight against extremism, regional stability and an independent Iraq.

“And we’re also involved with them in their oil business, and that’s always been very important from their standpoint and from our standpoint. So we have a lot of very positive things to talk about,” said Trump.

Asked whether there was a plan for US troops to remain in Iraq, Trump said: “We’re down to 5,000. So we’re down to a very low number – historically low. And we’ll see what happens.”

There are approximately 5,200 US troops in Iraq advising and assisting Iraqi security forces in the fight against the Islamic State group.

“How much of this shit do we have to listen to?” Trump said he asked. “How much are we going to listen to?”

The speech was not open to reporters but CNN obtained a recording of Trump’s remarks at Mar-a-Lago, which it said undermined official explanations for the decision to kill Suleimani at Baghdad airport on 3 January.

The White House has claimed Iran posed an “imminent” threat to US interests and lives. Trump’s own statements, including the claim that four embassies were threatened, have muddied the water considerably.

He has also claimed “it doesn’t really matter” whether the attack was imminent or not or whether his advisers were in agreement, because of “the terrorist” Suleimani’s “horrible past”.

Congress was not informed of the strike in advance, its eventual notification was heavily classified and a congressional briefing prompted bipartisan protest. Democrats have proposed legislation to rein the president in.

The death of Suleimani prompted Tehran to launch retaliatory rocket strikes on US targets in Iraq. Having said no one was hurt, the Trump administration said on Friday 11 US service members in fact suffered blast-related concussions.

In both cases, the administration has demonstrated a willingness to surprise by unilaterally leveraging US strength in the pursuit of long-term outcomes, despite considerable short-term risks and without wide consultations. As Ronald Reagan showed in the 1980s with his strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, such aggressive unilateralism can work. But it is best used selectively and sparingly.

In seeking to address long-term US (and European) grievances against certain Chinese trade practices, the Trump administration decided to abandon the traditional approach of seeking redress through existing multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization. Instead, it opted for what game theorists call a non-cooperative approach, imposing harsh tariffs on Chinese imports and then threatening even more should China retaliate. By weaponising what is traditionally an economic-policy tool, the US has been able to pursue national-security objectives alongside economic and financial goals.

So far, at least, the underlying calculation has worked for Trump. Just like his unilateral push to overhaul the North American Free Trade Agreement, he has shown a willingness to tolerate some damage at home in the hope that the damage inflicted on the other parties would be far greater and force them to make concessions.

Pressing an adversary into a corner in the hope that it will make a mistake is an old strategy

The Reagan administration perfected this approach when it embarked on an accelerated arms race with the Soviet Union (or what Reagan labelled the “evil empire”). In ratcheting up defence spending, Reagan leveraged the US’s economic and financial strength in the knowledge that the Soviets could not possibly keep up. In the end, he secured not only a narrow tactical victory but a wider geopolitical triumph, eventually culminating in the Soviet Union’s collapse.

Pressing an adversary into a corner in the hope that it will make a mistake is an old strategy. And as with any strategy, it comes with potential costs and risks. In Reagan’s case, his administration had to bear the economic and political costs of creating large budget deficits, as well as the risk of a serious military confrontation with the Soviets.

In the case of Nafta, the Trump administration ran the risk that retaliation by Canada and Mexico would result in beggar-thy-neighbour outcomes for all. After an initial attempt to do so, however, they made many of the concessions the US wanted and that are now included in the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). China, however, initially reacted differently, and may have overplayed its hand. By prolonging trade tensions with the US through an extended tit-for-tat escalation of tariffs, the authorities allowed the economy to slow and prompted many companies to start diversifying their supply chains in an effort to reduce their reliance on China. The new mantra among a growing number of those operating in China reflects this: “In China, for China”.

The immediate effect of these developments has been to complicate China’s effort to implement the structural reforms needed to maintain its historic (if not unprecedented) rise. But over the longer term, the further-reaching effects of the trade war could increase the possibility that China will become ensnared in the middle-income trap, like so many developing countries before it. If that happens, the US will have managed to avert the global economy’s full evolution from an American-led order to a bipolar one.

All of this takes us to Iran, where the Trump administration’s recent confrontation seems to be following the same playbook. The pattern is clear: the administration takes a surprise step that its predecessors might have considered but never pursued; it does so without wide internal and external consultations. The immediate result is a significant spike in tensions, with third countries (including allies) raising concerns about America’s unilateralist turn. The adversary (in this case Iran) issues a response that, while less severe, leads it also to make a tragic mistake (the accidental downing of a civilian passenger flight). Now, even the European countries that had long sought to salvage the 2015 Iran nuclear deal are accusing Iran of violating that agreement.

How this conflict will play out remains to be seen. But it is already clear that the US has made some gains, and that the greatest immediate risk – an outright war or a destabilising asymmetrical conflict – has been avoided, at least for now.

Again, however, this is not to suggest that the strategy of pressing one’s relative strengths is always advisable. Excessive reliance on aggressive unilateralism risks dismantling an international architecture that has served US interests well. Moreover, the Trump administration’s actions, if pressed too hard, could force third countries to make choices that run counter to US interests. Witness, for example, some countries’ continued willingness to deepen their economic and financial relationships with China through its “Belt and Road Initiative,” despite US objections.

In the end, aggressive unilateralism is not an approach that can be applied as a general rule. It should be used in a highly selective and infrequent manner, and only after a careful assessment of the costs and benefits. Done right, it can help achieve targeted gains while containing collateral damage. But if it is abused, far-reaching unintended consequences could follow, implying ever-higher costs over time.

Defense One reported on Thursday night that 11 US troops sustained injuries in the strikes, which followed report after report after report that some Americans were blown out of towers and received concussions when the missiles hit.

That prompted the Pentagon, following a week of administration assurances that the US had suffered no casualties, to admit there were indeed victims of the Islamic Republic’s assault.

Those service members from al-Asad airbase in Iraq were “treated for concussion symptoms from the blast and are still being assessed” in Germany and Kuwait, Capt. Bill Uriarte, a spokesperson for US Central Command, said in a Thursday night statement sent to reporters.

“When deemed fit for duty, the service members are expected to return to Iraq following screening. The health and welfare of our personnel is a top priority and we will not discuss any individual’s medical status,” he added.

President Donald Trump’s clear red line with Iran was that its military or regional proxies couldn’t kill an American. If they did, the US would respond forcefully. He followed through on that red line in late December after a Tehran-backed proxy militia killed a US contractor in Iraq, prompting the president to strike five of the group’s sites, leaving 25 members dead and another 50 injured.

And after members of that same militia — Kata’ib Hezbollah — surrounded and breached the US Embassy in Baghdad on New Year’s Eve, setting the front reception room ablaze, Trump opted to kill top Iranian military leader Qassem Soleimani on January 2.

Six days later, Iran responded with its own counterstrike, launching 16 missiles at the al-Asad airbase and another site in Iraq’s north.

Thankfully, no one died in the attack — leading many to speculate that Iran had purposely tried to avoid killing anyone to try to limit the potential US response.

“This threat exists,” said the German defence minister, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, at a press conference in London.

She was asked about an article in the Washington Post that claimed Trump had secretly warned France, Germany and the UK that the US would impose a “25% tariffs on European cars” if they did not activate the mechanism for the settlement of disputes (MRD) of the Iranian international nuclear agreement reached in Vienna in 2015.

Kramp-Karrenbauer told reporters on Thursday: “This expression or threat, as you will, does exist.” She is in the UK to meet her counterpart, Ben Wallace, to discuss Anglo-European defence cooperation post-Brexit.

Her remarks came as ministers from the five countries with nationals killed in the Ukrainian plane downed by the Iranian military met in London to coordinate their response to the Iran’s handling of the crash inquiry, as well as treatment of victim’s families.

Following the meeting the ministers called for an independent and transparent investigation governed by international civil aviation conventions. With emotions running high over the US assassination of Iranian commander Qassem Suleimani, as well as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ belated admission of responsibility for downing the jet, Iran is likely to bridle at being told how to carry out its own inquiry.

A Ukraine International Airlines Boeing 737 plane was shot down outside Tehran killing all 176 crew and passengers. Iran’s handling of the crash led to four days of street protests mainly in Tehran.

Iran initially denied responsibility for the crash, but three days later admitted that it had downed the plane believing it was an incoming US missile. An Iranian national security commission is investigating the episode.

There is concern that some in Iran are refusing to cooperate with the international investigation and refusing to hand over the black box flight recorder. There are claims within the country that the US may have jammed Iranian radar, making it impossible for the anti-aircraft battery operator to have checked the status of the plane.

Trump made his tariffs threat to Europe relatively recently and European diplomats insist they had already made the decision in principle to trigger the dispute mechanism because of previous Iranian steps away from the deal, but had not announced the move in deference to a request from China.

As a result they claim the Trump threat did not push Europe into abandoning its policy of trying to keep the nuclear deal with Iran alive.

But the threat is a further insight into Trump’s modus operandi, with Europe – in effect using threats of economic sanctions and the power of the dollar to try to force Europe to follow US foreign policy.

The news will only confirm the view of Iranian foreign minister, Javad Zarif, that Europe is failing to stand up to a high school bully. Zarif met the EU external affairs chief, Josep Borrell, to discuss the European decision to trigger the dispute mechanism, describing it as “a strategic mistake”.

Meanwhile, the Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, revealed that Iran is now enriching more uranium than it did before it agreed to a nuclear deal with world powers in 2015.

Speaking on live TV on Thursday, Rouhani said: “We are enriching more uranium than before the deal was reached … Pressure has increased on Iran but we continue to progress.”

Iran has gradually scaled back its commitments under the nuclear deal in retaliation to Washington’s withdrawal from the pact in 2018 and its reimposition of sanctions that have crippled the country’s economy.

Trump withdrew from the nuclear agreement in part because it did not address Iran’s support for armed groups across the region and its ballistic missile programme.

Iran continued to abide by the agreement until last summer, when it began openly breaching some of its limits, saying it would not be bound by the deal if it saw none of its promised economic benefits.

After the airstrike on 3 January that killed Gen Qassem Suleimani, the architect of Iran’s regional military operations, Iran said it would abandon all restrictions in the nuclear deal.

Mr Johnson said he recognised that Mr Trump saw the accord as “flawed” and suggested he could renegotiate it.

Mr Rouhani warned that “all Trump has done is break promises”.

He also criticised the UK, France and Germany for triggering the nuclear deal’s dispute mechanism after Iran breached key commitments.

President Trump abandoned the nuclear deal in 2018 and reinstated US sanctions on Iran to try to force it to negotiate a new agreement that would place indefinite curbs on its nuclear programme and also halt its development of ballistic missiles.

The five remaining parties to the deal – the European powers plus China and Russia – want to keep it alive. But the sanctions have caused Iran’s oil exports to collapse, the value of its currency to plummet, and sent its inflation rate soaring.

After the Trump administration increased the pressure on Iran in May 2019, the country responded by gradually lifting all limits on its production of enriched uranium, which can be used to make reactor fuel but also nuclear weapons.

Iran announced that the final limit had been lifted earlier this month, days after top Iranian general Qasem Soleimani was killed in a US drone strike in Iraq. Iran’s armed forces also fired ballistic missiles at two Iraqi bases housing US forces in retaliation.

Trump called time on Iran’s growing military confrontation by killing its beloved General Qasem Soleimani.

The Europeans are calling time on Tehran’s diplomatic escalation — namely its intentional drift from compliance with the nuclear deal, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as it is formally known — by triggering the accord’s dispute resolution mechanism, known as paragraph 36.

Paragraph 36 sets a short timeline to escalate (and hopefully resolve) a dispute. First it goes to the deal’s Joint Commission body then, if consensus can’t be reached, on to the signatories’ foreign ministers, before eventually reaching the UN Security Council. Iran is on notice they must come back to compliance.

France, Germany and the UK triggered this Tuesday while Tehran was reeling from the loss of Soleimani and grappling with the international and domestic fallout from downing Ukraine International Airlines flight 752, with the loss of 176 lives. The backlash includes significant street protests calling for the overthrow of the Supreme Leader.

There is a short window before Iran regains its composure and its usually intransigent posture, or at least that seems to be the European calculation: Strike while the iron is hot.

Kaine said Tuesday the new resolution now has support from Republican Sens. Todd Young of Indiana and Susan Collins of Maine, giving him the four GOP votes he needs for it to pass. Republicans Sens. Mike Lee of Utah and Rand Paul of Kentucky also back it.

“[I] expect to vote for — if offered the opportunity — the amended Kaine resolution,” Young said earlier Tuesday, emphasizing that he did not support the initial draft. “It’s important that Congress at this time affirm our Article I responsibilities, so long as we don’t undermine the president’s Article II responsibilities, that’s all the Kaine resolution says.”

Collins on Tuesday said Congress can’t be sidelined on important decisions.

“The Kaine resolution would continue to allow the President to respond to emergencies created by aggression from any hostile nation, including Iran, and to repel an imminent attack by Iran or its proxy forces,” she said in a statement. “It simply makes clear that only the Legislative Branch may declare war or commit our armed forces to a sustained military conflict with Iran.”

Lee and Paul said last week they would also back Kaine’s resolution after some changes to its language. Lee announced his support after top Trump administration officials briefed lawmakers about the killing of top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, which the Utah Republican described as “the worst” he’d seen on a military issue in his nine years in the Senate.

Still, 51% say they disapprove of the way Trump is handling the nation’s policy toward Iran while 43% approve – a divide that’s similar to the President’s overall approval rating in this poll (43% approve to 52% disapprove).

Here are some more key findings:

45%, say Soleimani’s killing has made Americans less safe, while 32% say it has made the U.S. safer and 18% say it had no impact on Americans’ safety.

Voters are split over the decision to send more troops to the Middle East after Soleimani’s death — 44% approve, 46% disapprove. But most, 58%, say they think the tensions between the US and Iran will not lead to war, 29% say they will.

About two-thirds, or 64%, say they would oppose going to war with Iran, though a majority of Republicans — 55% — say they would support it.

According to numerous people in the room, Milley was the most vocal defender of the intelligence. Multiple Hill Democrats said Milley came across as trying to match the bombast of the President in defending the strike.

One Democratic lawmaker told CNN they were turned off by Milley’s pitch on behalf of the administration, particularly when he insisted that the intelligence was “exquisite.” The lawmaker argued Milley’s rhetoric was divorced from how intelligence is actually assessed.

“General Milley went out of his way to defend the intel behind the QS strike as so utterly compelling,” a Democratic aide in the room told CNN. “It was embarrassing.”

Not everyone reacted that way. Many Republicans and some Democrats came away impressed by Milley and defended him as an “honest broker” in the words of Virginia Democrat Sen. Tim Kaine.

Still, the briefing — and indeed the strike on Soleimani itself— marks a critical moment for the 61-year-old four-star general. At the peak of an illustrious military career, Milley’s non-partisan reputation is being put to the test as he defends the most controversial foreign policy decision of Donald Trump’s presidency.

In doing so, Milley has come dangerously close to wading into political realms that are usually out of bounds for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who is typically there to provide non-partisan military advice.